Assimilation, pluralism or exclusion? Normative conceptions of integration among majority and minority citizens in Germany

Sabrina J. Mayer[1] and Stephanie Müssig[2]

[1]German Center for Integration and Migration Research DeZIM & University of Duisburg-Essen
[2]Erlangen Center for Islam and Law in Europe EZIRE, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg

Abstract:

The responsiveness of political decisions to the wants of the people is essential for a stable democracy. Highly contested issues such as integration, that is currently exploited by radical right parties for vote shares, put this system to a test. Even though the term integration is highly debated, is is far from clear what citizens understand by it as there is no agreed-on definition. This article assesses the normative perceptions of integration, i.e. the integration culture, in the German population. Using a large-n online survey from 2019, we analyse 1,723 manually coded answers from an open-ended question to observe which conceptions of integration exist. Furthermore, we analyse if they differ between Germans with migration background and without migration background from the East and the West and how age cohorts affect this. We find that assimilatory and pluralist views prevail the most in all groups. However, exclusionary views are the least likely among those of immigrant-origin, becoming significantly less common among West Germans and those of immigrant-origin alike).

1 Introduction

Even though immigrant integration is a widely used and often polarized term, its exact meaning is far from uniquely agreed-on (e.g., Maxwell, 2018; Sobolewska et al., 2017). Contrary, the amount of theoretical concepts that are used for studies on immigrant integration is vast and includes concepts such as assimilation (e.g., Esser, 2000b), but also newer views such as unity-in-diversity or multiculturalism (e.g. Berry, 1980; Fleras and Elliott, 2002; Koopmans et al., 2005). One main reason for this myriad of conceptions is that research on integration is driven by events (Portes, 1995). As a consequence, it is affected by political practice and public interest of a particular place, researcher, and time (e.g., Bommes and Thränhardt, 2010; Heckmann, 2002; Kalter, 2008). Thus, the meaning of integration varies dependent from context and led by aspects that can be either pre-condition or result of integration.

Currently, most Western democracies experience rising numbers of immigrant-origin inhabitants (e.g., Bird et al., 2011) and national governments as well as supranational organisations, such as the EU, thus are looking for immigration and integration policies that accommodate their societal needs. Recently, however, policy making in this area is challenged by the rise of right-wing populist parties (Golder, 2016) that exploit the topic of supposedly failed immigrant integration to their advantage by stirring up xenophobia (e.g., Arzheimer and Berning, 2019; Rydgren, 2008). Parallel to the scientific debate, German policy on immigrants changed over the years. For the longest time Germany maintained a policy aiming at restricting immigration and fostering return migration, leaving integration policies at the margins or providing them exclusively to particular immigrant groups (e.g., Brubaker, 1990; Joppke, 2005. In the last 15 years, this course changed to a policy alleviating the integration of immigrants and their children with an emphasis on structural integration, i.e. educational attainment and integration into the labour market (e.g. Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo, 2016; Joppke, 2007).

So far the meaning of immigrant population to the general population has rarely been explored. The few existing studies analyzed the criteria when integration is deemed successful (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015, 2017; Zick & Preuß, 2018) and and did not focus on the normative conceptions of integration itself. As the congruence of a state's policies and structures with its citizens' wants, demands, and needs is important for the on-going support of the political system and societal cohesion, we argue that we need to know about the citizens' perceptions of key political terms. Furthermore, according to political culture theory, institutions are supposed to shape individual attitudes (e.g. Almond and Verba, 1963; Roller, 2015. Analysing groups with different socialization experiences allows to test this assumption.

In this article, we analyse the normative perceptions of immigrant integration among citizens in Germany.[1] We focus on three different subgroups, Germans without immigration background from the East and West) as well as Germans with immigrant background which allows us to see whether they hold homogeneous conceptions of integration in line with the current course of integration policy or if different political and societal experiences can be observed for the different subgroups. We use data from an online-survey conducted in October 2019 whose more than 2,500 respondents were asked about their perception of integration in an open-ended question (valid answers N = 1,723).

Our article starts with the theoretical framework on conceptions of integration. Afterwards, we discuss German integration policy. After discussing data and measures, we employ directed qualitative coding to explore the perceptions of integration. We conclude with a summary of results and an outlook on what this means for integration policy and its congruence with citizens' attitudes.

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[1]We understand attitudes towards concepts of immigrant integration as normative conceptions because we investigate what people think immigrant integration *should* be and do not ask about attitudes towards implemented policies. Thus, the attitudes surveyed here contain an oughtness component, indicating which actions should be undertaken and which should be refrained from. Hence, we call them normative conceptions.

2 Normative conceptions of integration and their corresponding analytical concepts

The overall normative discussion around integration can be ordered by tracing them back to three major questions. On the individual level, it is asked *what an immigrant should achieve to be integrated*, on the societal level *how the integration of immigrants into the larger society should be organised* and on both levels *who is responsible for integrative achievements* - the newcomers, the host society or both. As our analysis relies on a theoretically deducted coding scheme (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), we need first to discuss the existing analytical concepts of integration.

The individual question *what an immigrant should achieve to be integrated* addresses specific goals that should be met by the immigrant, or characteristics that the immigrant is supposed to acquire. These goals usually are related to different societal dimensions, the most well-known model in this regard was introduced by Hartmut Esser (Esser, 1980; Esser, 2004; Esser, 2008). Drawing on Parson's structural-functional theory, Esser identifies four societal dimensions where integrative action takes place, the cognitive-cultural, structural, social, and identificative dimension.[2]

Capital is at the heart of Esser's understanding of integration, especially in the first three dimensions. Cultural capital is key to *cognitive-cultural integration* and shapes the abilities of immigrants to adjust their behaviour to the requirements of the receiving context, in order to act and interact with it in social and cultural terms (Esser, 2000a, p. 289). It encompasses knowledge and skills regarding social values and social norms (rules of behaviour), as well as codes and symbols used for communication and social interaction (Hölscher, 2008). The most commonly used indicator for cognitive

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[2]The distinction into different dimensions was already earlier suggested by Gordon (1964). Since then, the division of (social) integration into sub-dimensions has become well-established in immigrant integration research (see Esser, 2001; Heckmann, 2015) as it allows to analyse integration more thoroughly: immigrants can be very well integrated in one societal area, but not very well in another (Aigner, 2017).

integration is language acquisition, common indicators for cultural integration are the attachment to social values and norms, and the acceptance of the way of life in the host country. In contrast, human capital shapes *structural integration*, i.e. the actor's position in society (Esser, 2000a). It encompasses all productive features and abilities of a person, such as (academic) knowledge, organisation- and communication skills as well as analytical ability (Becker, 1992).Therefore common indicators of structural integration are educational attainment and labour force participation. *Social integration* is based on social capital which is only available through interaction with others and is thus a relational resource(Bourdieu, 1983; Esser, 2000b; Haug, 2003). A typical indicator for social integration is (voluntary) interaction of immigrants with members of the host society. The concept capital is not applicable to the last dimension, *identificative integration.* It refers to the acquisition and internalisation of deeply held value orientations, attitudinal patterns and habits prevalent in the receiving society (e.g., Esser, 1980). Indicators for this integration dimension are the adoption of traditions, core values and life styles of the majority society. Because of its closeness to cognitive-cultural integration, we merge identificative integration and cultural integration into a new category called socio-cultural integration. Esser's integration model neglects the political component of society. Therefore we introduce a civic-legal dimension as additional object that encompasses formal *legal integration* as well as *civic integration.* A typical indicator for legal integration is naturalization. Typical indicators for civic integration are the exercise of civic rights and the fulfilment of civic duties.

The second question addresses *how the integration of immigrants into the larger society should be organised.* For further specifications, two dimensions have been suggested (Berry, 1997): First, the existence or absence of a relationship between immigrants and larger society. Second, the maintenance or omission of cultural peculiarities by immigrants. By combining the two-by-two features them systematically, four societal

outcomes are generated that mirror the normative conceptions of how the integration of immigrants into the larger society should be organised: integration, assimilation, segregation, and marginalisation. These four outcomes serve as objects of orientation, for our research the first two are most important. Integration encompasses all kinds of pluralist outcomes, where a relationship between immigrants and larger society exists, while immigrants keep their cultural peculiarities. Among the most common pluralist outcomes are multiculturalism, unity-in-diversity approaches, a universalistic view, and a post-migrant view. One of the main features of *multiculturalism* is the idea of enduring coexistence of immigrants and larger society based on equal rights, but with a separate minority identity (Löffler, 2011). *Unity-in-diversity* approaches on the other hand promote a "superordinate national identity against a backdrop of subgroup cultural differences" (Verkuyten et al., 2016, p. 866). The *universalistic* view encompasses tolerance, equality, social justice for all people, and the world at peace (Schwartz, 2007, p. 724). The *post-migrantic view* states that immigrants are only one group out of many that encounter societal des-integration (Foroutan, 2019). *Assimilation* is the societal outcome, when a relationship between immigrants and larger society is supported, however, the (visible) maintenance of immigrant characteristics is rejected (Gordon, 1964).

The third question addresses who should take action for enabling immigrants to integrate. Here are four outcomes possible, too: The immigrants have sole responsibility, the state/host society has sole responsibility, both take responsibility, neither take responsibility. Although we consider all three normative questions equally important, we will only focus on the first two of them due to the available data material.

3 Germany: Integration policies and public climate toward integration

We now turn to analyzing the factors that influence the development of normative conceptions on integration. Our concern is to compare normative conceptions of integration between German sub-populations, i. e. East Germans, West Germans and people with immigrant background. What to expect from this comparative design?

Normative conceptions develop through various channels during the life-course. When comparing East and West Germans, two theoretical concepts seem to be particularly important: Political culture theory and Social contact theory. Political culture theory suggests that political institutional settings shape public views (Almond & Verba, 1963). This should be even more the case, the longer the exposition to a political structure or a specific policy takes place (Nie et al., 1974; Almond and Verba, 1980, p. 29). Social contact theory suggests that frequent and meaningful contact between members of the in-group and the out-group promotes mutual tolerance and understanding for each other.

Due to the exposition to differing immigration and integration policies maintained of the two Germanys until unification in 1990, we expect to find differences regarding integration conceptions between East and West Germans that persist until today.[3]

Those policies continue to affect the eastern and western parts of Germany regarding the composition of society. The major share of immigrants and their children live in West German federal states. Thus, the opportunities for contact with immigrants are scarce in East German federal states until today. Social contact theory suggests that contact alleviate positive attitudes toward outgroups. Thus, we expect to find a higher share of accommodating views among West Germans than among East Germans.

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[3]Studies on differing outlooks on policies and on differences with satisfaction with democracy between East and West Germans support this assumption (e. g.Roller, 1994; Roller, 2015).

In order to get an idea about possible differences and communalities between East and West Germans regarding their normative conceptions on integration we provide a comprehensive overview of the different immigration and integration policies of the then Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and the former German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) until 1990 in this section. We continue with the immigration and integration policy of unified Germany from 1990 on with a special emphasis on changes in the political agenda regarding immigrant integration.

German immigration and integration policy has changed over the years. When starting their recruitment programmes for workers form abroad, West-Germany (the then Federal Republic of Germany - FRG) and East-Germany (the former German Democratic Republic - GDR) initially both took up the idea of a rotation policy, assuming that immigrants leave the countries after some time. This was meant to prevent the permanent residence of guest workers.

When labour migration to East-Germany gained momentum in the mid-1980s, the GDR maintained this rotation policy in the strictest sense, aiming at maximum control over the lives of the foreign workers (Weiss, 2017, p. 70). They had to live cut-off from East-German social life in residential accommodation, and were barred from taking up contact with the local community on their own. When the contracted time was up, the state ensured that the return to the home country took place. The strict separation of guest workers and host society led, additionally fostered by the strict state control of the media, to ignorance and misconceptions of foreigners among the East-German population (MacConUladh, 2005; Cooper, 2012, p. 250). Thus, labour migration barely took effect on the societal development of the GDR (Weiss, 2017, p. 70). After the collapse of the regime in 1989 and the unification of the West- and East-German political systems the *Foreigners' Act* (*Ausländergesetz*) of the Federal Republic was transferred to the East-German federal states.

In West-Germany the motto "Germany is not an immigration country", denying any duty to accommodate to the needs of migrants and refugees was publicly only revised in the late 1990s by the then social democratic/green coalition government. However, legislation maintaining immigration and integration came up already in the late 1950s through three channels. One channel was policy-making on the European level, starting with the Treaties of Rome (1957), suggesting freedom of movement for all citizens of countries in the European Economic Community (EEC). Other contracts and treaties of the EEC and its successor, the European Community (EC), followed from 1961 on and alleviated labour force migration between member states.[4] The second channel were the contracts for guestworkers, starting 1955 with Italy, ending 1968 with then-Yugoslavia.[5] The third channel were so-called post-war adjustments, enabling immigration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe to Germany.[6] Legislation on these adjustments encompassed measurements for integration, such as language classes, as well as preparatory classes and occupational re-training for integration into the labour market for this group. In the 1980s the call for measurements to foster the integration of all migrants came up.[7] However, in the centre of West-German policy-making remained considerations how to restrict immigration and alleviate return migration until the late 1990s.

After unification of East and West Germany, a "historical change" (Herbert, 2003, p. 333) in integration policy took place in 1999 with the reform of citizenship law, turning away from *ius sanguinis*, introducing *ius soli*.[8] The first comprehensive legislation on

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[4]Other far-reaching measurements for the alleviation of labour force migration between EEC-member states followed in 1964 (abolishment of the national preference system) and 1968 (abolition of work permit).

[5]Moreover, Germany maintained contracts with Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco and South-Korea (1963), Portugal (1964) and Tunesia (1965).

[6]Article 116 of the German *Basic Law* assigns automatic citizenship to ethnic Germans resettling in Germany.

[7]Additionally, constitutional court rules on deportation orders counteracted to the no-immigration-country motto (Joppke, 1999, p. 64).

[8]*Ius sanguinis* refers to citizenship acquired by the nationality or ethnicity of one or both parents. *Ius soli* refers to birthright citizenship.

integration in 2005 strengthened this course, e.g. by introducing obligatory language and civic education classes universally for new immigrants. Since then the motto of German integration policy is "Support and Demand" (*Fördern und Fordern*), relating to an understanding of integration that relies on the supply of state services on the one hand and on immigrants' efforts to fit into society on the other hand. Government keeps on emphasising this reciprocity. However, some observers contend that in practice and in debates it becomes clear that migrants are expected to make the main effort.[9]

The emphasis of measurements is clearly on structural integration, such as educational attainment and labour force participation, and their preconditions, such as language acquisition. Since 2015, with the peak of the so-called migrant and refugee crisis, notions of social and cultural integration are on the fore. This reflects also the public opinion in the 2000s that citizenship should only follow after accomplished cultural and economic integration (Cooper, 2012, p. 401)

After having given a concise overview over German integration policy, it becomes clear that institutional experiences regarding integration policy differed to a smaller extend as expected, and to a lesser extend than in other policy areas such as the economy or social welfare.

At the time of the German unification in 1990 the opinion climate was heated up against foreigners all over Germany, and the reluctance to accept immigrants as part of the German population prevailed in both parts East and West. The heated debate on immigrant and asylum policy coined the political climate of the 1990s and was the first mutual political experience of East and West Germans, as Herbert (2003) noticed.[10]

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[9]Petra Bendel analysed party programmes and their integration concepts in 2017. She concludes that "integration mainstreaming" prevails: integration enhancements and measurements not only aim at immigrants, but also at the benefit of the host society. www.bpb.de/apuz/251211/alter-wein-in-neuen-schlaeuchen-integrationskonzepte-vor-der-bundestagswahl, www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/256307/integration.

[10]The debate was mainly around a possible amendment to the Basic Law (*Grundgesetzänderung*) *Art. 16a GG* on asylum.

State benefits/services to migrants and refugees were seen with suspicion. The view dominated that – if at all – migrants themselves have to adapt to societal structure by their own efforts.Thus, the in integration policy toward a more conciliate immigration and integration legislation with emphasis on reciprocity from the end of the 1990s on has been a new experience for Germans in both parts of the country.

On this basis, we now specify some of our assumptions made at the beginning of this section. We start with a Political Culture point of view.

Starting with the question what immigrants should achieve to be integrated, we differentiated between five societal dimensions of integration. Given the longstanding tradition of guest worker programmes that East Germans and West Germans experienced in the GDR and FRG, respectively, as well as the current emphasis on structural integrative measurements, we expect that both East and West Germans place a high emphasis on structural integration, such as labour force participation and participation in the educational system.

An equally high emphasis should be on cultural dimension of integration. A review on research of the last twenty years or so clearly shows that people fear in general symbolic threats more, i. e. the delution and decline of cultural habits, symbols, and meanings, than economic threats by immigrants (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Thus, both East and West Germans should valuate cognitive-cultural and socio-cultural integration at least as important as structural integration.

Turning to the question how immigrant integration into larger society should be organised, we also expect to find a similarity between East and West Germans. Given the long-standing experience with a reluctant policy and public opinion to accommodate to immigrants, we expect to find a high valuation of an assimilationist view on integration among both, East and West Germans, leaving pluralist conceptions second-best.

From the perspective of Social Contact Theory, more a difference between East and West Germans can be expected.

Social Contact theory suggests that opportunities for contact and interpersonal exchange reduce negative attitudes toward immigrants (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Although polls noted in the early 2000s a slight increase of personal contact at work and in the circle of friends between Germans and foreigners in both East and West, opportunities for contact with immigrants in everyday life differ between East- and West-Germany considerably until today. (East Germans went from 1990 on through the process that West Germans started already in the 1960s (Connor, 2010, p. 370; Herbert, 2003, p. 308).) In East Germany, opportunities for contact and interaction are limited because the majority of immigrants and their descendants live in West-Germany. There, especially in cities, some districts are strongly influenced by ethnic economy, making it an integral part of urban life. In East-Germany, only few cities have a visible share of immigrants.[11]

Therefore we expect that an exclusionary views, i.e. the opposition to the visibility of immigrants in everyday life and a general negative view of immigrants, is higher among East Germans compared to West Germans.

How do people with immigrant background complete the pictures on normative conception on immigration? The most important reason to include people with immigrant background into our comparative design is that they are the ones affected by immigration and integration policies. We expect their normative conceptions on integration to differ from both, East and West Germans.

Germans with immigrant background experienced the *longue-duree* of finding a place in a new society themselves or through the experience of their parents. The political change regarding immigrant policies did not go unnoticed by them, and they became

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[11]One of them is Leipzig in Saxony with an immigrant share of 15.4 % on the population in 2019 (https://statistik.leipzig.de/statdist/table.aspx?cat=2&rub=4&item=207, accessed 4 August 2020).

more confident in making demands toward a more reciprocal outlook on integration. Therefore we expect that they favour different from East and West Germans pluralist conceptions of integration over assimmilationist views.

Through the requirement to master everyday life in Germany and through their high educational and occupational aspirations (e. g., Beicht and Walden, 2019), they should put structural integration and its cognitive-cultural preconditions such as language acquisition first, when it comes to specific social areas of integration. Also highly valuated should be civic integration, such as to obey the law and fulfilling civic duties (not to forget: our respondents all have German citizenship that requires at least a modicum of civic loyalty). At the same time they were able to form an opinion on what kinds of adaptions they find off-limits/which expectations they do not want to meet. Therefore we expect that Germans with immigrant background should devalue demands that touch upon their private life as socio-cultural integration demands, such as exercise of religion, preferences regarding food, or language use in private, and hold to a lesser amount negative conceptions of integration than East and West Germans do.

4 Data and methods

4.1 Data set and operationaisation of group status

We rely on a non-probability online survey that was fielded by the public opinion and data company YouGov in Germany from 10 to 17 October 2019. In total, 2,577 participants took part, randomly drawn from two samples with and without immigrant background. The sample of Germans without immigrant background comprised 1,546 persons (773 each currently living either in the Western or Eastern part of Germany); the sample of German citizens with immigrant background comprised 1,031 persons. We define Germans with immigrant background as Germans who themselves were born

abroad or at least one of their parents. For the first sample, quotas based on the German micro census for age, gender, and education were applied. 1,723 of the 2,577 participants provided a valid answer for our variable of interest, the question how they perceive integration, so all of the following analyses refer only to these respondents.

Our article's aim is to analyse which normative conceptions of integration exist among Germans and whether they vary systematically between East and West Germans and Germans with immigrant background. We assume that respondents in East and West Germany experienced different regime types, styles of political socialisation, and immigration policies. To code the group status we relied on four steps. First, we asked respondents in which federal states they lived before their 18th birthday (dividing Berlin into East and West Berlin). If they only lived within East or West German states, we coded them accordingly. In a second step we used a question on social identification ("How strong do you feel as a East/West German?", 5-point rating scale) to group those respondents that lived as well in East as in West Germany before turning 18 years old (n=30). Depending on how they felt more, we grouped them as East or West Germans, respectively. Third, for those who did not answer the social identification question (n=14), we used their current place of residence as grouping criterion. Fourth, intra-German migration can affect how well the current place of living relates to political socialisation. We thus measure with a dummy if somebody was socialised in the East and is now living in the West[12] – such a person would still be coded as belonging to the East German group– and vice versa (1 = moved to another part, 0 = socialised and living in the same place). In total, of our sample without migration background 453 were socialised in East Germany, 606 socialised in West Germany. Furthermore, 147 persons have moved from East to West (41) or vice versa (106).

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[12]For this, we were not able to distinguish Berlin into the East and West part and decided to count respondents living in Berlin as living in East Germany

Furthermore, our sample contains 650 Germans of immigrant origin. We assume that first, the socialisation in the country-of-origin or the on-going contact with it for the descendants at least affects perceptions of integration and second, that being subjected to integration policies and to experience how their output is affecting the outcome of one's own life outplays the effect of being socialised in the East or West and distinguishes oneself from the group of Germans without migrations background (Soehl & Waldinger, 2012; Wong & Tseng, 2008). Thus, we code these respondents as a group of their own with specific experiences, defined as Germans born abroad or with at least one parent born abroad are part of this group. In this group, we are not able to differentiate between countries of origin[13]. Of course, respondents of this group also lived or grew up in East and/or West Germany.[14] In total, 603 of those of immigrant-origin were socialised/live in the West, and 47 in the East, which is congruent with the well-known German demographic distribution. In multivariate analyses later we will also control for socialisation in the East/West. Based on the country-of-origins political set-up, we measure with a dummy if the country was democratic when the respondent was 10 years old[15] (1 = democratic, 0 = not democratic), using Polity-IV (Marshall & Jaggers, 2003) values 6-10. Of the 650 respondents, 206 (31.7 %) are from democratic countries. We assume that democratic countries are in general more open to immigration and this might thus affect integration perceptions (Natter, 2018).

The summary statistics for the three groups is shown in Table 1. We see that those of immigrant origin are much younger, compared to native Germans (by ~14-15 years),

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[13]The group of Germans with immigrant-origin is a rather broad category, compromising people from more than 30 different countries that migrated themselves (first generation, 253, most common countries of origin: Poland and the former USSR) and those whose parents migrated (second generation, 398, most common country of origin: Turkey).

[14]For first generation immigrants we use the current place of residence. For the second generation, we proceed accordingly to the respondents without migration background.

[15]As we do not have the year the first generation respondents migrated to Germany, and a lot of countries oscillated between democratic and non-democratic, we decided on this cut-off.

slightly better educated and the share of women is lower (all differences significant p < 0.001).

Table 1: Sample summary statistics

	Age	Education	Gender: female
Immigrant-origin			
Mean	37.82	3.58	0.331
SD	15.71	0.74	0.471
West German			
Mean	52.66	3.09	0.484
SD	17.26	0.75	0.500
East German			
Mean	51.21	3.24	0.501
SD	16.37	0.62	0.501
N		1,723	

As both parts of Germany were reunified in 1990, we include a dummy variable that measures if respondents were socialized before or after German reunification. As cutoff, we define 1984, those before were (partly) socialized in the respective political system and its institutions, those afterwards began primary school in the unified Germany. Most changes to German citizenship regime happened only in 2000 and beyond. Thus, we cannot distinguish an age cohort that was socialized after these changes. The shares for the different groups are displayed in Table 2. As respondents of the immigrant-origin group are on average much younger (see Table 1, they have a higher share of being socialised after reunification compared to respondents without migration background who were mainly socialised before.

4.2 The dependent variable: Perceptions of integration

For analysing the normative perceptions of integration, we rely on an open ended-question about the meaning of integration. We used the following question wording:

Table 2: Age cohorts by group, column percentages

Socialised...	Immigrant-origin	West Germany	East Germany
...before reunification (< 1984)	47.23	80.98	78.83
	(307)	(494)	(365)
...after reunification (1984+)	52.77	19.02	21.17
	(343)	(116)	(98)

"*Many politicians and media outlets use the term 'integration' when talking about living together with people from abroad. However, it is not clear whether everyone means the same by 'integration'. Would you tell us what you have in mind when you think about the term 'integration'?*"[16] Usually, attitudes towards immigration and integration policies, are surveyed with standardised formats. For Germany, open-ended questions have never been used before to assess normative conceptions toward integration in a population survey. Thus, our approach is new. This associative task has a cognitive, an affective, and an oughtness component, and is thus highly demanding. In section 4.2.1 we will discuss the effects of the high requirements of this task on item non-response. In section 4.2.2 we will share the coding scheme we have developed to assess the normative conceptions among German citizens.

4.2.1 The operationalisation of the dependent variable and discussion of item non-response

1,723 of the 2,577 participants (66.9 %) provided at least one valid answer, 44 (1.7 %) provided an answer that was not usable (e.g., "skdöjfasdjf") and 810 (31.4 %) chose the "don't know" option that was provided. We suppose, based on the general literature on item non-response (e.g., Tourangeau et al., 2012), that non-response for this item is not at random but related to respondent characteristics, such as education (the more

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[16]The original wording in German was "Viele Politiker und Medien in Deutschland verwenden den Begriff "Integration" um über das Zusammenleben mit Menschen ausländischer Herkunft zu sprechen. Dabei ist nicht klar, ob alle das Gleiche unter 'Integration' verstehen. Können Sie uns bitte sagen, was Sie selbst unter dem Begriff 'Integration' verstehen?"

educated, the more likely to answer) and political orientation (the more on the left or right, the more likely to answer). Indeed, we find significant differences on the 0.1 percent level for the likelihood of non-response between the groups (37.0 % Germans with migration background, 29.9 % Germans without migration background from West and 31.3 % for those from East Germany). Furthermore, non-response is more likely for those with lower levels of education, being more in the middle of the 11-point left-right self-orientation scale (which we collapsed to the range 0-5), with lower levels of political interest, with lower age, and men (all differences significant $p < 0.001$, two-sided t-tests). Furthermore, those that rate the concept of integration more neutral (5-point scale, 1 very positive to 3 neutral to 5 very negative, which we collapsed to the range 0-2 taking absolute values)[17], were more likely to not provide an answer.

Results from a binary logistic regression on the likelihood of non-response for all these variables can be found in the supplementary information, Table 3. These estimations show that there is no significant difference between the different groups when the other variables are taken into account, thus having a migration background or not does not significantly relate to the likelihood of non-response when other explanatory factors are controlled for. When we analyse the valid answers, we find that, on average, each response was 135 letters long ($SD = 89$) with no significant differences between the groups.

4.2.2 Development of the coding scheme

To systematise the open-ended answers we applied directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), encompassing four steps. First, we developed a theoretically deducted coding scheme, based on the concepts of integration compiled in section 2 that included one category with references to specific dimensions of individual integration and five

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[17]Question wording: "And how do you rate the term "integration"? Is this term for you...", German original wording "Und wie bewerten Sie den Begriff "Integration"? Ist dieser Begriff für Sie..."

Table 3: Binary logistic regression on item non-response for the open-ended integration question, Average Marginal Effects

	Item non-response
Sample (Ref. Immigrant-origin)	
West Germany	-0.03
	(0.02)
East Germany	-0.01
	(0.02)
Evaluation of Integration (abs)	-0.11***
	(0.03)
Left-Right Self-Placement (abs)	-0.08**
	(0.03)
Education	-0.17***
	(0.05)
Gender:female	0.06**
	(0.02)
Age	-0.03***
	(0.00)
Political Interest	-0.31***
	(0.03)
N	2,461
McFadden's Pseudo-R^2	0.08
AIC	2833
BIC	2885

All independent variables recoded to the range 0-1. Standard errors in parentheses

major categories/codes how immigrant integration should be take place, *Assimilatory view*, *Pluralist view*, *Universal view*, *Post-migrant view*, *Exlusionary views*. Second, we adjusted this coding scheme by drawing 5 % randomly out of all answers in both samples for Germans with and without immigrant background and coded them ourselves. This led us to a coding scheme consisting of six major categories, and 37 minor categories. For every response, up to six categories could be coded in the order of occurrence. Every minor category could only be coded once for each response.

In a third step, two student assistants coded all 1,723 answers according to the adjusted scheme. The share of total agreement (the same number of codes where given and the same codes were given) between both coders was 48.1 %. The two authors classified all

diverging answers into the coding scheme after discussing each matter. Fourth, after the full coding was done we reduced the scheme and merged categories as several had only very few mentions. In total, we merged 17 minor codes that matched well other codes (e.g. turnout, running for public office, participate in the political process where merged into the code "Civic integration: exercise rights"). In total, about 2.3 different minor codes were given to each response with no significant differences between the three groups of interest.

In the end, the final code book consists of six major codes and 17 minor codes that are displayed in table 4.

The column *Description* refers to the respective major code (bold-faced), the theoretical types of immigrant incorporation and areas of integration, or the minor code that further differentiates the major codes. The column *Example* refers to wording examples that serve as guideline how to code an answer given by a participant.

Table 4: Operationalisation of concepts of immigrant incorporation

Code	Description	Example
	RQ 1: What needs to be achieved by individuals to be considered integrated?	
100	**References to specific dimensions of integration**	
110	Legal dimension	Naturalization of foreigners
120	Cognitive-cultural dimension	Learning the German language
130	Civic dimension: exercise rights	Run for office, turnout etc
140	Civic dimension: fulfill civic duties	Adhere to the constitution and public laws and rules
150	Structural dimension	Being part of the workforce, finish school
160	Social dimension	interact with Germans
170	Socio-Cultural dimension	Adherence to German traditions, become Christian, core values and life styles
	RQ2: How should immigrant integration take place place?	
200	**Assimilatory view**	
201	Adapt/adjust to the greater good	Adjusting to the respective country
202	Integrate into society	Becoming a part of society
203	Integration as duty of migrants	Not the Germans have to adapt, but the foreigners
210	**Pluralist views**	
211	Mutual acculturation/multiculturalism	References to tasks of the host society or mutuality stressed (no one-way street, respecting each other), mutual acceptance of differences
212	Public accommodation	Public provision of language classes, civic courses, occupational preparation, etc
213	Unity-in-diversity	Maintain peculiarities/live up to own culture while sharing core values
220	**Universal view**	
221	General universal view	Living together peacefully, nobody is excluded or left behind
230	**Post-migrant view**	
231	General post-migrant view	References to various social groups that are disintegrated, not only foreigners should learn to integrate, many Germans without migration background must also become more involved in society
240	**Exclusionary view**	
241	Insults and allegations	Many of them do not want to integrate/they are all criminals/parasites
242	Requests for specific bans: hijab, mosques, halal meet, no parallel society	e.g. head scarves should not be accepted
900	Other mentions	integration means to integrate
999	Meaningless combination of characters	??, skdöjfasdjf

5 Findings

We start our analyses with the individual-level question what an immigrant should achieve to be considered as integrated. More than half of our respondents referred to this part of integration. Shares are highest among those of immigrant-origin (58 %) compared to 50 to 47 percent among respondents without migration background from West respective East Germany. These differences between respondents of immigrant-

origin and all respondents without migration background are significant on the 5-percent level.[18]

Table 5: Shares of minor codes for specific references by group, column percentages

References to specific dimensions	Immigrant origin	Western Germany	Eastern Germany
Legal dimension	0.009	0.010	0.013
Cognitive dimension	0.272	0.215	0.203
Civic dimension: exercise rights	0.055	0.079	0.040
Civic dimension: fulfill civic duties	0.206	0.211	0.214
Structural dimension	0.092	0.096	0.110
Social dimension	0.074	0.033	0.026
Socio-cultural dimension	0.352	0.292	0.267

Multiple answers were possible, thus column percentages add up to more than 100 %

Read: 27.6 % of all respondents of immigrant-origin named examples for cognitive integration

Next, we explore the minor codes for the category of references to specific societal dimensions of integration (see table 5). The categories most used among respondents from all three groups are the socio-cultural dimension (e. g. references to traditions and life styles) which is named by about a third or a fourth of all respondents, the cognitive-cultural dimension that encompasses language skills, and the civic dimension of fulfilling civic duties, such as adhering to the constitution and various norms, which were named by about one fifth of all respondents. Only very few respondents referred to the legal dimension of holding citizenship, the civic dimension of exercising civil and political rights and the social dimension. About 10 % of respondents in each group refer to the structural dimension that includes being part of the workforce or obtaining formal educational degrees. When we compare the groups, we find significant differences for two particular dimensions, the social and the cultural one. More than twice as many respondents of immigrant-origin name being connected with majority members of society as part of integration compared to respondents without migration background (about

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[18]All group differences were analysed with ANOVA pair-wise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons.

7 to 3 %, at least p < 0.01). Similarly, more respondents of immigrant-origin (about +7 percentage points, at least p < 0.05) refer to German traditions and values when they disclose their view on what integration should be. In addition, immigrant-origin respondents have significant higher shares for the cognitive dimension when compared to respondents from West or East Germany (p < 0.05).

We also explore how those specific dimensions are structured and perform principle-component analysis (see Table 6). Except for the cognitive dimension, we find clear component loadings. Component 1 denotes an area of integration that focusses on the value and civic duty dimension whereas Component 2 is not so much about conceptions and values but about specific structural and social actions. Component 3 includes only the legal dimension.

Table 6: Principle component analysis on minor codes for specific references by group, rotated component loadings

	Component 1	Component 2	Component 3
Legal dimension			0.909
Cognitive dimension	0.604	0.516	
Civic dimension: exercise rights		0.551	
Civic dimension: fulfill civic duties	0.689		
Structural dimension		0.752	
Social dimension		0.563	
Socio-cultural dimension	0.759		

All factors have Eigenvalues > 1; orthogonal rotation; factor loadings below .3 blanked

Next, we analyse the shares for the five major codes by group that are displayed in Table 7. Among those views associated with theories about how immgrants are supposed to be integrated into society, first assimilatory and second pluralist views prevail among Germans without migration background. In addition, they have similar high shares among those of immigrant-origin with no significant differences between the three groups. Assimilatory and pluralist views are low, but significantly negative correlated with each

other (r -0.15). Post-migrant views are the rarest amongst the three groups, again with no differences. One major difference can be found regarding exclusionary views. Indeed, holding such views is most common among respondents socialised in East Germany, and significantly higher, at least on the 5 percent level compared to respondents of immigrant-origin (+9.0 percentage points, $p < 0.001$) and compared to respondents socialised in West Germany (+4.6 percentage points, $p < 0.05$).

Table 7: Shares of major codes by group, column percentages

|	Immigrant origin	Western Germany	Eastern Germany
Assimilatory view	0.423	0.408	0.393
Pluralist views	0.334	0.281	0.272
Universal view	0.122	0.147	0.110
Post-migrant view	0.022	0.036	0.024
Exclusionary views	0.091	0.137	0.181

Multiple answers were possible, thus column percentages add up to more than 100 %

Read: 9.1 % of all respondents of immigrant-origin disclosed exclusionary views of integration

Last, we analyse what affects normative perceptions of integration on the societal level. As only about 50 respondents hold post-migrant views, we exclude this major code from the analyses. In total, we estimate four logistic regression models, with the major code as dependent variables, including age, gender, education, and political interest as controls. For each of the three groups, we estimate separate regression models. In all models, we include a dummy if somebody was socialised before or after reunification. For respondents of immigrant-origin we include a dummy if they were socialised in East or West Germany and if their country-of-origin was democratic during their primary socialisation (see section 4.1 for details). For respondents without migration background we include a dummy if they moved across the country.

As the variables for cross-country moves (among majority respondents) and place-of-socialisation in Germany (for the immigrant-origin respondents) do not have substantial effects, they were not included in the coefficient plots (for the full regression tables see

Figure 1: Binary logistic regressions on integration perceptions, Average Marginal Effects

Appendix, Table 8)). Our analyses show that being socialised in a democratic country-of-origin (or when the country-of-origin was democratic) has a significant positive effect on the likelihood of holding a pluralist view of integration of about nine percentage points ($p < 0.05$). Being socialised before or after German reunification only matters for respondents from West Germany, who were less likely to hold exclusionary views towards immigrant integration when they were born after reunification (- 21 ppt, $p <$ 0.01). We see the same phenomenon for the East German group (-12 ppt), however, this relation is not significant.

6 Conclusion

Our article is among the first that analyses normative perceptions of integration focusing on two central question: what immigrants ought to achieve on the individual level to be considered integrated and how in general immigrants ought to be included into the general society. We found largely similar patterns amongst the three groups, e.g. the socio-cultural dimensions was named the most, as well as the cognitive-cultural dimension. Legal integration was only named by very few respondents. Interestingly, we found differences for the social, cognitive and cultural dimension of integration: significantly more respondents of immigrant-origin named being connected with majority members of society as well as speaking the German language as something that ought to be achieved by immigrants. In addition, significantly more respondents named adherence to German values and life styles as something that needs to be achieved by immigrants. Regarding the specific fields of integration, the patterns of conceptions resemble the concept of social citizenship by T.H. Marshall, albeit that it is not the state's responsibility to provide economic, social, and civic goods, but the responsibility of the immigrant to acquire them. Concerning the way how immigrants should be included into society, assimilatory and pluralist views were the most common among all groups. We find as expected immigrant-origin people in Germany to be less likely to hold exclusionary, negative views of integration than people without a migration background. Furthermore, holding such views is most common among respondents socialised in East Germany compared to respondents of immigrant-origin as well as to respondents socialised in West Germany. We also find the democratic status of the country-of-origin for immigrants to matter significantly for the prevalence of holding pluralist views concerning immigrant integration as well as being socialised after reunification and citizenship law changes to matter negatively for the prevalence of holding exclusionary views in West Germany.

Concerning the limitations of our study, due to the open-ended question in a standardized survey, we cannot be sure that respondents all understood the question in the same way. It could be that some answered this question in a sense how the German majority population sees integration, and others referred to their personal stances (as we intended it). Furthermore, a rather high share of respondents, about one fourth, did not name anything and due to our analyses in 3 we can suppose that this non-response is systematic, i.e. we might systematically miss specific parts of the possible answer universe. Our results show that normative perceptions of integration are to a certain degree similar between different groups in the population but we can also see substantial differences when it comes to the dimensions of integration as well as views how immigrants should be integrated into society. We found political institutions/socialisation to matter to a certain degree which normative perceptions an individual holds. Further studies are needed to validate our results and to see what we can find for different societies and points in time.

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7 Appendix

Table 8: Logistic regression on normative perceptions

	200 West	200 East	200 Imm	300 West	300 East	300 Imm	600 West	600 East	600 Imm	400 West	400 East	400 Imm
Political Interest	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.03	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.11***	0.01	0.05	-0.04*	-0.06*	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Gender:female	0.08	-0.04	-0.06	-0.09*	-0.02	-0.10*	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07*	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.00	0.00	-0.01*	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Born after reunification	0.07	0.12	-0.13	0.03	0.03	0.07	-0.21**	-0.12	-0.01	0.05	-0.10	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Moved within Germany	0.01	0.14		-0.00	-0.07		0.05	-0.16		-0.04	0.03	
	(0.05)	(0.08)		(0.05)	(0.08)		(0.03)	(0.09)		(0.04)	(0.05)	
Socialised in West Germany			0.06			0.02			0.07			0.08
			(0.08)			(0.07)			(0.06)			(0.06)
Democratic country-of-origin			-0.06			0.09*			-0.00			0.04
			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.02)			(0.03)
N	610	463	648	610	463	648	610	463	648	610	463	648
Nagelkerke's R²	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.02
McFadden's R²												
AIC	833	624	887	710	545	823	471	434	398	517	321	482
BIC	864	653	922	741	574	858	502	463	434	548	350	518